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MOTOR

CARRIER LITIGATION IN THE
COURT SINCE 19291
By Join

SUPREME

J. GEORGE*

In order to facilitate a more satisfactory focus on principles and trends revealed in the regulation of motor carriers as
adjudged by the Supreme Court in the last three years the
writer prefers to treat the various phases of the regulatory
process rather than consider the cases seriatim, the types of
constitutional question presented, or the various forms of motor
transportation involved.
AUTHORIZAT1ON

To OPERATE

Public permission to operate a motor carrier service takes
the form of a certificate of public convenience and necessity,2 a
permit, or a license.
Whether the state commission could condition a certificate
operate
interstate bus service between Columbus, Ohio and
to
Huntington, West Virginia by forbidding specifically a proposed route loop into Kentucky thence back into Portsmouth,
Ohio, came to the Supreme Court in J. P. Grubb Company v.
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.3 The commission ruled
that the loop was merely a device whereby the applicant aimed
to transport passengers between Portsmouth and other Ohio
points without submitting to Ohio regulations as an intrastate
carrier.
'Cases decided by the Supreme Court through 1929 (except
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 1928);I treated in
"Motor Carriers and the Supreme Court," Commercial Law League
Journal, February, 1930.
*John J. George, A. B., Washington and Lee, 1920; A. M., University of Chicago, 1922; Ph. D., Michigan, 1928. Author of "Motor Carrier
Service and Rates" (Band and White, Spartanburg, S. C.) and articles
in the field of motor carrier regulation in many legal and political
science periodicals. Professor of Political Science at Rutgers since
1929.
"Factors in Granting Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity" I published in Indiana Law Journal, January, 1930; and as
chapter 7 of my Motor CarrierRegulation in the United States (Band
and White, Spartanburg, S. C.)
1281 U. S. 470, decided May 19, 1930.
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To enjoin state enforcement of the loop prohibition Grubb
sought interlocutory and permanent injunctions in the Federal
district court which granted the interlocutory injunction.
At this point Grubb tested in the state supreme court the validity of the commission order prohibiting the loop, which validity was sustained. When the permanent injunction petition
came on for hearing the Federal district court announced that
the final judgment in the state court constituted res adjudi&wta
in the district court and dismissed the petition. From this decree Grubb appealeda to the Supreme Court.
In its opinion by Justice Vandevanter the Court first directs attention to the jurisdiction of Federal and state courts
over interstate commerce: (1) Although appellant acknowledged and invoked the state court jurisdiction he may now
question that jurisdiction, for jurisdiction over the matter rests
on law and not on mere consent; (2) inadmissible and worthless is the view that the Constitution commits to Federal courts
and denies to state courts jurisdiction over all cases of regulation or attempted regulation of interstate commerce; (3) except
as reserved to Federal courts by acts of Congress those courts
and state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over civil suits
under the Constitution and Federal statutes; (4) of such character is the litigation here involved that it could proceed in both
state court and Federal court until a final judgment is reached
in one, the judgment thereby becoming a res adjudicat in the
other.
As to the merits of the procedure actually employed by appellant, the court said: (1) Without value is the contention
made here that the state court could not review the commission
order, as it has repeatedly done so in earlier and later cases;
the rulings of state courts on these questions of local law must
be just as controlling in this court as in the Federal district
court; (2) failure of the state court to mention specifically the
constitutional validity of the commission order did not eliminate
the question from the case; its opinion shows clearly that the
court rested its decision on the question of validity among other
causes; such omission does not weaken the res adjudicatacharacter of the judgment of the state court; (3) failure of appellant to present to the commission the fact that an earlier interstate bus applicant had obtained from the commission authority
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to operate over a route including the loop at Portsmouth and his
failure to offer that fact at the Ohio Supreme Court review preclude his presenting it in the present bill; "he was not at liberty to prosecute that right (of attack on the validity of the
commission order) by piecemeal, as by presenting only a part
of the available grounds, and reserving others for another suit,
if failing in that"; (4) where the parties and subject matter
are the same in two suits as regards both the matters "actually
presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted" and "any
other available matter which might have been presented to that
end," appellant must accept the rule that a judgment on the
merits of one suit is res adjudicata in. another.
Holding unsubstantial the objections of appellant to the
district court dissolution of the injunction and dismissing the
bill, the Supreme Court sustained the motion of appellee to
affirm the decree without awaiting oral argument. Thus the
state was upheld in so applying its regulatory power to interstate motor carrier certificates as to safeguard against a subterfuge devised to defeat state power to regulate motor carriers of
passengers in intrastate commerce. The opinion further clariflea the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts over
interstate commerce.
In April 1933 the Supreme Court in another Ohio case sustained the commission in denying a certificate to a proposed interstate motor common carrier freight service because the traffic
on the proposed route was already sevexely congested. Attention
was called to the fact that the state law allows an amended
petition specifying another route ^A
A third Ohio case involved the authority of Cincinnati to
classify "you-drive-it" automobiles as public vehicles and to require a license for their use of the streets. 4 The plaintiff contended that the ordinance constituted a deprivation of property
without due process and a denial of equal protection. The trial
court agreed, and granted a permanent injunction; the state
8
ABradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Advance Opinions, October, 1932 Term, 746-50. See below, "Safety and Liability
Protection."
'Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335; 76 L. Ed.
323. January 4, 1932. A liability protection requirement was provided
as discussed below in Safety and Liability Protection.
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court of appeals tried the case anew, and upheld the ordinance
and this judgment was sustained by the state supreme court.
The Supreme Court in review sustained the ordinance by
the following reasoning: (1) The state has power to regulate
the use of its highways in order to promote public safety, and
may prohibit or condition as it sees fit the use of city streets
as a place for carrying on private business; (2) appellants certainly understand that use of streets is essential to operation of
cars they rent out, and the ordinance does not interfere with a
business unrelated to matters of public concern; (3) it is not
shown that the ordinance deprives appellants of property without due process, nor does it arbitrarily or capriciously violate
equal protection; violation of equal protection cannot be substantiated "by mere conjecture or speculation."
But public authorization of motor service in the litigation
here surveyed has centered emphatically around contract carriers.5 Cases involving this type have come from Kansas, Florida, and Texas.
The Kansas Act of 1931 classifies motor carriers into public carriers of property, public carriers of passengers, contract
carriers of property, contract carriers of passengers, and private motor carriers, the latter being construed by the statute as
those hauling property sold or to be sold by them in pursuance
of some private enterprise. Public carriers are required to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity as a condition to operate; the others, merely licenses.6
Continental Baking Company, a private motor carrier of
property in Kansas and other states delivering its goods by
truck to customers, contended the act by its classification and
obligations denied equal protection and deprived petitioner of
property contrary to due process, violated privileges of citizens
of the United States, and ran counter to the commerce clause.
But the district court denied an injunction against enforcement,
and petitioner appealed to the highest tribunal.
5A separate article analyzing the entire body of regulation applied
to the contract carriers in the last two years, I am now preparing.
6All motor carriers operating entirely within a municipality, private motor carriers operating exclusively in a radius of 25 miles
from their domicile municipality, and owners who by their own vehicles" transport their own live stock and farm products to market or
supplies for their own use, are exempted from the statutory requirements.
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Speaking of the license requirement as authorization to
operate, the Court acknowledged the state power to require a
license of private motor carriers of property on reasonable conditions, approved the exemptions from license requirements as
set forth in the statute, and admonished that a classification7
need not possess theoretical or scientific uniformity to be valid.
A Florida Act of 1929 provided that persons and corporations owning, operating or managing any motor vehicle used for
transportation of persons or property for hire or as common
carriers over a regular route on public highways must obtain a
certificate of public convenience and meet other requirements.8
Whether this act could validly apply to a motor carrier operating under exclusive contracts with one specified concern and
over regular routes between Jacksonville and other points in
Florida, the operator being so engaged when the act was instituted, came to the Supreme Court in Smith v. Cahoon.9 The
highest court in Florida had held the statute validly applicable
to such a carrier. But the Supreme Court reasoned thus on the
applicability: (1) The measure puts on the same footing all
carriers covered by the act; (2) while the act does not expressly
require private carriers to become common carriers, it does aim
to subject to same obligations all carriers covered by its scope;
(3) such a regulation of private carriers, which appellant undoubtedly is, transcends the power of the state; (4) no line of
severance between the regulations applicable to common carriers and those relating to private contract carriers is made by
the statute; (5) no knowable standard of conduct is set up, and
the legislature could not impose on laymen at the peril of criminal prosecution, the severance of statutory provisions, and clarification of questions in a field of regulation in which "even
courts are not yet in accord."
Because of this inseverability and uncertainty, the statute
'Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352.
8 Italics are mine. Taxicabs, hotel busses, school busses, vehicles
hauling exclusively agricultural, horticultural, dairy or other farm
products, fresh or salt fish, oysters and shrimp from point of production to assembly point en route to primary market, and those transporting and delivering dairy products only were exempted from the
scope of the statute.
'283 U. S. 553. An excellent summary of the entire opinion in this
case appears in the later case of Stephenson v. Binfor, Advance OpinIons, October 1932 Term, 209.
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was held inapplicable to appellant, the lower court was reversed
and the cause remanded for further hearing.
More successful was the Texas Act which required of common carrier motor vehicles a certificate of public convenience
and necessity and of private contract carriers, a permit, subjecting both types to the usual scope of state regulation, and
authorizing the commission to fix minimum rates for private
contract carriers, which shall not be less than those charged by
common carriers with which the private contract carriers are
competing. Contract carriers by truck over Texas highways
attacked the statute as converting contract carriers into common
carriers by fiat and as denying them equal protection by exempting from the permit and other restrictions specified for contract
carriers those vehicles transporting particular farm products.
To these contentions of appellants, the Supreme Court in
sustaining the statute pointed out that regulations similar in
some instances, if not identical, could be applied by the state to
the two types of carrier without putting them on the same regulatory basis; that this statute stated clearly and distinctly the
provisions applicable to each, did not assume to force contract
carriers to become common carriers; did not interfere with appellants in confining their business to private contract transportation; and no deprivation of property without due process
nor any taking without just compensation resulted from the
regulations.
As to certainty and severability of provisions aimed at
contract and common carriers the contrast between the Texas
and Kansas Acts on one hand and that of Florida on the other
may well serve as a significant guide for all legislative bodies
facing the problem of regulating contract carriers.
USE AND PRESERVATION OF HIGHWAYS

Use and preservation of highways constitute a primary
motive actuating regulations of motor carriers, and the litigation here surveyed merely confirms this general principle of
long standing. Highways are public property, their use is primarily for private purposes; using them for profit is special
and this use the state generally may prohibit or condition as
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it sees fit.10 Accepting the view that "you-drive-it" cars are
public vehicles, the Court emphasized the authority of the state
(city) to prohibit or grant on conditions it deems proper the
use of streets as a place of carrying on private business."
To decrease or ease the burden imposed on the highways
by employing them for private contract carrier transportation
is a proper object of the legislative power, said the Court in
Stephenson v. Binford, stating further that where fhe object is
one for which the legislative power may be properly exercised,
it is for the judgment of the legislature and not of the courts
to determine the degree to which the provisions of a statute
tend toward that end, the degree of their efficiency, and the
closeness of their relation to the end sought.
In an extremely liberal and constructive portion the opinion continues: "It is enough if it can be seen in any degree
or under any reasonably conceivable circumstances there is an
actualrelation between the means and the end...... Anyhow, if
the legislature concluded the requiredrelation existed we must
accept that conclusion since we cannot say the legislature clearly erred in reaching it. Debatable questions of this type are not
for the courts but for the legislature which is entitled to reach
12
its own conclusion."
To the contention of appellant Stephenson that the Texas
statute conflicts with the freedom of contract the Court observed
that in conflicts between the exercise of freedom of contract and
the state power and obligation to protect its property against
injury and maintain it for the uses for which it was primarily
designed the freedom of contract must yield to the extent reasonably necessary to effectuate the state power and obligation.
This interference with freedom of contract is constitutionally
warranted by the fact that appellants contracts contemplate the
use of state highways for execution of these contracts, which
contracts must "be deemed to have been made in contemplation
of the regulatory power of the state. The power of Congress
to regulate private contracts wherever reasonably necessary to
effect any of the great purposes for which the national govern1
"Stephenson v. Binford, Advance Opinions, October 1932 Term,
203. 77 L. Ed.
2 Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335.
"Italics are mine.
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ment was created applies to the states under like circumstances."
Stating that it was not necessary to consider whether the
act in some other phase "would be good or bad" the court held
it sufficient to support the validity of the statute since one of
its aims was to conserve the highways, and rejected the contention that the presence of other legislative purposes, considered separately, beyond the state power to make effective would
destroy the act.
State power and obligation relative to the highways, have
figured prominently in connection with the interstate motor carrier transportation. In the Continental Baking case1 3 appellants were engaged in intrastate and interstate delivery of their
goods. That interstate motor carriers are subject to state regulations relative to highways appears in the opinion that since
their movement on highways is destructive to the surface
thereof, reasonable state regulations of highway use which do
not discriminate against interstate commerce affected thereby
impose no unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
For the use of the highways employed by the agencies of
interstate commerce an exaction may be imposed which constitutes a fair contribution to the cost of construction, maintenance
and regulation of traffic on the highways, we hear from Justice
Brandeis in the Interstate Transit opinion. 14 While the contest
in this case was over a tax, 15 the question was decided on
grounds of use and preservation of highways.
A matter of particular concern in Supreme Court litigation
and more so in the uncontested legislative and administrative
practice in the states seeking to preserve the highway surface
is the fixing of limits on weight of vehicles using the highways.
In Carley & Hamilton v. Snook,16 the Court ruled that
equal protection was not violated by a state statute classifying
motor vehicles on a weight basis for purpose of imposing a graduated weight tax from which tax vehicles under 3,000 pounds
were exempted. Such an exemption recognizes the unusual danger to which highway surface is subjected by the heavier vehicles.
.3286 U. S. 352.
-283 U. S. 183 (1931).

See division on "Taxation" below.

16281 U. S. 66; 74 L. Ed. 704.

Decided February 24, 1930.
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The most serious and significant situation relative to preservation of highways has developed in Texas. Over the 200,000 miles of highways in the state, 20,000 of which the state
has improved at a cost of $250,000,000 and has appropriated
many millions annually for maintenance of the entire mileage,
there were operating 65,000 trucks in 1924. A 300 percent increase brought this number to 206,000 in 1930. Of all motor
vehicles in the state in 1930 less than one-half of one percent
exceeded 7,000 pounds carrying capacity; and of the 206,000
7
trucks only 5,500 exceeded 7,000 capacity.'
These 206,000 trucks were making such extensive use of
the highways that in 1931 the legislature enacted maximum
limits on height, length and weight of motor vehicles operated
on the highways,' 8 forbade loads in containers of more than 30
cubic feet in volume and weighing more than 500 pounds each,
prohibited the operation of any commercial property transportation vehicle, truck-tractors, or trailers beyond limits of a
municipality if load exceeded 7,000 pounds and of all motor
vehicles outside a municipality if the weight exceeded 600
pounds per inch of width of tire on any wheel concentrated on
the highway surface.
From the length, weight, and height limits were exempted
every vehicle used to transport property from point of origin
to nearest practicable common carrier loading point or from such
common carrier unloading point to destination by the shortest
practicable route, provided the vehicle does not pass a delivery
or receiving point of a common carrier equipped to transport
such load, or the vehicle is hauling property from point of origin to destination when the destination is nearer the point of
origin than to the nearest practicable common carrier receiving
point prepared to transport the load concerned. For vehicles
so employed a maximum combination length of 55 feet, and
weight of 14,000 pounds is allowed. Further, the statute authorizes an exceeding of these limits if a special state permit therefor is obtained, and exempts from the limits busses, agricultural
"T
Findings from a survey made by the Federal district court prior
to adjudicating the questions involved in Stephenson v. Binford, and
incorporated in the opinion of the Supreme Court in its review of district court dismissal of complaint against the Texas statute. Advance
Opinions, October 1932 Term, at 831-32.
8 Height, 96 inches; length; single vehicles 35 ft.; combination, 45;
load weight, 7,000 pounds.

K. L.--4
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machinery, water drilling -machinery, and highway building
machinery.
Sproles and others, operating as common and contract carriers of property in interstate and intrastate commerce, and
particular manufacturers and distributors of commodities
sought to enjoin the enforcement of the act on the grounds that
the provisions conflicted with due process and equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, conflicted with the commerce clause, and violated the contract clause. The Federal
district court dismissed the complaint, and an appeal was taken
to the Supreme Court. Let us observe the opinion of the Court
on each particular complaint in the monumental case of Sproles
v. Binford.19
As to the relation of the limits fixed to the due process
clause Chief Justice Hughes for the Court reasoned that (1)
the 7,000 pound maximum weight limit does not deprive truck
operators of their property without due process; (2) state control over its highways is not restricted to obtaining revenue for
construction and maintenance, or to regulating the operation of
vehicles thereon, but state power extends to prevention of
hazards and wear on highways attributable to excessive size and
undue weight of load, over both of which the legislature clearly
has a range of discretion; (3) "an intolerable supervision hostile to basic principles of our government and wholly beyond
the protection .intended by the Fourteenth Amendment" would
result from requiring a scientific exactness as a "criterion of
constitutional power;" (4) granted that the subject lies within
the state police power "debatable questions as to reasonableness
are not for the courts but for the legislature, which is entitled
to its own judgment and its action within its range of power
cannot be set aside because compliance is burdensome"; (5)
we know of no constitutional distinction admitting the power
of the state to fix total load limit and denying authority to fix
net load limit.
Whether the net load limit conflicted with the commerce
clause evoked three points of argument; (1) there being no Federal regulation on interstate motor commerce, "the state may
prescribe uniform regulations adapted to. .... the conservation
29286 U. S. 374.
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of the use of the highways," applicable alike to vehicles engaged
in interstate and intrastate commerce; (2) no discrimination
against interstate commerce is revealed in the present case, and
state regulations assumed "to be otherwise valid come within
the accepted principle that in matters admitting of diversity of
treatment according to special requirements of local conditions,
the states may act within their respective jurisdictions until
Congress sees fit to act"; (3) but in so fixing the weight and
size standards one state cannot so prescribe as to "derogate
from the equal power of other states to make regulations of
their own."
Further the Court stated that the limits do not deny equal
protection by exempting machinery of an agricultural, water
drilling, or highway building character; by fixing limits of
length for individual vehicles and combinations thereof and
allowing a greater length and heavier load to those vehicles
hauling goods between point of origin and destination and a
common carrier receiving or unloading point; by exempting
busses from the net load limit imposed on motor vehicles transporting freight; by classifying motor carriers into carriers of
property and carriers of persons, and prescribing separate regulations accordingly, nor by failure of regulations to "reach
every class to which it might be applied." A rational basis
must support the classification made; and in restricting the size
and weight of vehicles allowed on the highway the legislature
may consider the frequency and character of the use made of
the highway by the various classes of operations, and accordingly adopt regulations for each class of operations.
The state fixing of load limits was sustained as valid, constituting no unlawful violation of contracts existing when the
statute was enacted. By empowering the highway commission
to grant permits for loads exceeding those fixed by statute the
legislature was not making any unlawful delegation. Further,
the Court held that the lengthy phraseology of the provision
exempting from the limits vehicles operating to and from a
common carrier loading or unloading point did not void the
statute for uncertainty.
For these reasons the Supreme Court sustained the statute,
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and affirmed the district court dismissal of complaint against
the act. 20
SAFETY Am LIABmiTY PROTECTION

The litigation has involved state power to promote highway
safety and to require liability protection.
In the Hodge case 21 the Court justified the regulation of
the use of the highway on grounds of promoting public safety,
and saw in the "you-drive-it" use of automobiles a greater peril
in operation than in operation of vehicles by owner or chauffeur.
Since their movement on the highways presents a constant and
serious danger to the public, motor vehicles may be dealt with
as a special class, declared the Court in Continental Baking Co.
v. Woodring;22 here the statute involved by imposing on the
commission the duty to have the vehicles maintained in a safe
condition and to exact proper qualifications and working hours
for drivers required no action not related to public safety.
Relative to the liability insurance provision of the Florida
Act of 1929, a statute invalidated as applicable to appellant
contract carrier because of its inseverability, the Court said:
"We entertain no doubt of the power of the state to insist on
suitable protection for the public against injuries through the
operation on its highways of carriers for hire, whether they are
common carriers, or private carriers." 2 3
Sustaining the liability insurance requirement applied by
Cincinnati to lessors of "you-drive-it" cars, the Court reasoned
that "it does not seek to make hirers agents or employees of
owners, nor make owners responsible for negligence of hirers.
It merely requires giving security that lessees will answer in
suits for damages for their own acts of tort.'"24
21The limitations as to size (maximum of 30 cubic feet) and
weight (maximum 500 pounds) of containers and maximum of 14,000
pounds load thereof applied to only uncompressed cotton bales. In behalf of W. T. Stevens, intervenor, ahd transporter of such cotton the
district court had held the limitations valid only if construed together
with the provision to become effective January 1, 1932 and forbidding
operation on public highways beyond city limits of motor vehicles of
more than 600 pounds per inch width of tire concentrated on highway
surface.- The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling.
=284 U. S. 335.
2286 U. S. 352.
21Smithl v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553.
Quaere: What is the value of this "insurance" If the
24Note 21.
lessee appearing in court for negligent operation is adjudged responsi.
ble for damages but possesses no property with which to pay?
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The Texas statute of 1931 regulating contract motor carriers of property specified liability insurance or bond be furnished the state commission in proper amounts. In the
Stephenson case 25 appellant had sought injunction against the
enforcement of the whole act before the state commission had
attempted to apply the insurance provision. To the liability
protection requirement the Court in its opinion sustaining the
lower court stated substantially: Since no effort has been made
to enforce the liability protection provision against appellants,
they cannot attack its validity as an attempt to condition the
purely private contractual relationship between contract carrier and shipper. No state court has dealt with the question
and unless we have to do otherwise "we should not adopt a construction which might render the provision of doubtful validity,
but await a determination of the matter by the courts of the
state."
But the Court has ruled conclusively in Continental Baking
case.2 6 that liability protection can be required of private motor
carriers (construed in the Kansas statute as operators of motor
vehicles transporting property sold or to be sold by them in
pursuance of some private commercial enterprise), contract carriers of property, and contract carriers of passengers only as
security against injury or damages to third persons and their
property.
The ultimate in state obligation and authority to promote
public safety on the highway was recently recognized by the
Supreme Court in Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio. 2 7
Applicant had sought a certificate to operate an
interstate motor freight service over route 20 between Cleveland
and the Michigan line, enroute to Flint. The New York Central
and Pennsylvania railroads protested the application on the
ground that traffic was severely congested already on the proposed route. The commission, relying on two traffic counts
made at Fremont, concluded that addition of the proposed service would produce and continue an "excessive and undue haz"Advance Opinions, October 1932 Term, 203-214.
'8Note 22.
"Advance Opinions, October Term, 746-50, decided April 10, 1933.
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ard to public safety and security of the traveling public and
the property on such highway", and denied the certificate in the
interest of public welfare.
Contending that the commission order violated the Federal
commerce clause, and denied equal protection to him in relation
to vehicles transporting property of the owner, in relation to
common carriers already authorized, and as between himself as
a common carrier and contract carriers, Bradley asked and was
refused a rehearing, sought in vain from the state supreme
court a reversal of the commission order, and thereupon brought
appeal to the highest Court.
Basing its argument on the consideration of public safety
the Court reasoned as follows:
First: The commission order merely precludes operation
by the applicant on the route proposed. The statute allows
amended petition specifying another route, which petition ap.
plicant has not made; the commission is not obligated to offer a
certificate over an alternate route.
Second: Invalidity of previous state efforts to deny certificate 28 for interstate operation, on which denial appellant
relies, was adjudged because these efforts sought to "prevent
Promotion of safety was
competition deemed undesirable."
only incidental; here it is the controlling purpose. Highway
congestion is the test of safety used in the present case, and the
evidence adduced is sufficient to support the finding. Denying
the certificate has only an incidental effect on interstate commerce.
Third: "Protection against accidents, as against crime,
presents ordinarily a local problem;" safety measures constitute a proper exercise of the police power; to obtain safety is
primarily a state function whether on private property or on
public highways. Safety may preclude allowing further vehicles on the highway, and the denial is not violative of
the commerce clause if the denial is based on evidence that such
is necessary to the promotion of public safety.
Fourth: It is not suggested that Bradley received treatment less favorable than did those who made application at the
same time or later for common carrier certificates, or that intra- Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307; Bush v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 316.
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state carriers are favored over interstate. To obtain highway
safety the state may prescribe regulations favoring vehicles used
exclusively in the business of their owners different from those
for vehicles used by highway carriers. The denial here involved
does not discriminate in favor of previously authorized carriers,
for "classification based on priority of authorized operation has
a natural and obvious relation to the purpose of the regulation. "
On this reasoning the Court unanimously affirmed the
29
denial of the interstate certificate for the route proposed.
TAXATION

Seven of the eleven cases litigated involved tax provisions.
City power to exact a license fee for the use of streets by "youdrite it" cars was sustained in the Hodge case. 30 The Florida
Act imposed a mileage tax graduated according to carrying
capacity, to be paid quarterly in advance, five percent of the
proceeds to be used for administration of the act, and the residue to go to counties in proportion to highways used. Together
with other provisions this requirement was declared invalid as
applied to contract carriers, because the statute was not severable as regards common, carriers and contract carriers. 31
Whether commercial carrier vehicles operating principally
or entirely in municipalities were denied due process of the
Fourteenth Amendment and of the California constitution by
application of the state graduated weight tax, the state registration tax, and a city tax ranging from $5 to $42 per vehicle, the
state tax proceeds being directed to cost of administration, and
of construction and maintenance of county and state roads, constituted the question presented in Carley and Hamilton v.
Snook. 32
To this inquiry Justice Stone replied for the Court: (1)
Operators of motor vehicles chiefly or entirely within municipalities and paying the city a tax, 75 percent of the proceeds
going to street purposes does not deny equal protection of
Fourteenth Amendment or of California constitution by a state
" The Court held there was no occasion to determine whether the
statute discriminates unlawfully between common and contract
carriers.
"Note 21.
,1 Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553.
32281 U. S. 66.
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act exacting registration fees whose proceeds go to administration costs and highway purposes; (2) due process of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to apply proceeds
of motor vehicle registration fees for the benefit of those paying
the fees; (3) a state may under different enactments levy two
taxes on the same object to the extent that the total exaction,
if, levied by one statute, would not violate due process; (4)
motor vehicle registration fees are not "tolls" in sense of Federal highway legislation requiring that all highways aided by
Federal money be free from all types of tolls. Consequently
the Supreme Court answered the question in the negative and
affirmed the district court dismissal of petitions to enjoin the
collection of taxes.
Whether a gross receipts tax imposed by an amendment to
the California constitution in 1926 on all agencies engaged in
highway transportation for profit in lieu of all other taxes could
apply to the proceeds of a mail contract realized by a stage
operator between two California points was answered affirmatively by Justice McReynolds saying: "One having a contract
to carry the mails is not immune as an agency of Federal government from state taxation of property used in: the performance of such a contract," despite the tax being levied on the
gross receipts he realizes from his contract. 33
Is a foreign corporation doing a taxicab business denied
equal protection by a Pennsylvania statute imposing on all corporations a tax of eight mills per dollar of gross receipts realized from operation exclusively within the state I This question
34
was presented in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania.
Through Justice Butler the Court reasoned: (1) The corporation was subjected to competition from individuals and
partnerships operating taxicabs to whom the gross receipts tax
does not apply, but the taxicab corporation must pay all the
taxes imposed on natural persons operating taxicabs; (2) equal
protection safeguards foreign corporations3 5 in the protection
of laws equally applied to all in the same situation; (3) plaintiff corporation is entitled to the same protection of equal laws
in Pennsylvania as natural persons in Pennsylvania can demand
3Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509.
U. S. 389 (1928).
" Plaintiff in error was a New Jersey corporation.
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under like circumstances; (4) the state may exercise its taxing
power and adjust its legislation to differences in situation, and
to classify for that purpose, but the classification must avoid the
arbitrary and be "based on a real and substantial difference"
relating reasonably to the subject of the legislation; (5) state
power to deny authorization to a foreign corporation to do business in the limits of the state does not authorize the state to
require the corporation to surrender the protection of the Federal Constitution; (6) the words of the statute are so plain as
to require no explanation; the only contention is that the statute
taxes gross receipts of corporations but exempts those of natural
persons and partnerships; (7) we admit that a gross receipts
tax can be validly applied in particular situations, but we
regard the practical effect of the measure here involved and deal
with it according to its effect; (8) the tax involved could as
conveniently be levied on gross receipts of natural persons as
on those of corporations; it is not peculiarly applicable to corporations as are corporation capital stock tax or franchise tax;
(9) this measure distinguishes solely and discriminates solely
on the basis of the character of the taxicab operator; neither
the source of receipts nor the type of property used justifies the
difference in treatment; (10) since the classification does not
rest on a real and substantial difference reasonably related to
the subject of the act, the measure denies equal protection.
Therefore the Court held the statute void. But Justices
Holmes, Brandeis and Stone dissented, relying chiefly on the
opinion of the Pennsylvania court sustaining the statute as validly treating corporations separately for purpose of taxation.
The Kansas Act of 1931 imposes, in addition to the usual
license fees, a tax of one-half mill per ton mile operated by
vehicles of each of the five classes of motor carrier specified,
those commercial vehicles operating at all beyond the 25 mile
radius of their domicile municipality being required to pay the
mileage tax on the excess distance traveled. Resulting proceeds
are directed in part to cost of administering the regulatory act,
and in greater part to the highway fund.
Along with the other provisions of the act, this tax feature
was sustained by the Supreme Court as applied to a private
motor carrier of property on the ground that the state may
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require such a carrier to obtain a license, pay a tax so long as
the requirement is reasonable, and the excess of the tax and
license receipts over administration cost goes to the highway
36
fund.
The leading tax case of the period is Interstate Transit v.
Lindsey,37 involving the validity of the Tennessee Act of 1927
requiring operators of interstate motor buses on highways of
the state to pay a tax graduated according to carrying capacity
of vehicles used. For vehicles of 21-30 seating capacity the
amount was fixed at $500.
Interstate Transit, an Ohio corporation engaged exclusively
in interstate transportation between Cincinnati and Atlanta was
assessed $4,000 for its eight busses operating through Tennessee.
One quarterly payment was made and suit instituted to recover
on the ground that the act violated the interstate commerce
clause of the Constitution. The trial court allowed recovery,
but the state supreme court reversed the lower ruling and the
plaintiff appealed.
In an extremely clear, compact, and comprehensive opinion
Justice Brandeis reasoned as follows: First. -While the state
cannot tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, it
may levy on motor vehicles engaged exclusively in interstate
commerce an exaction for the use of the highways which is a
fair contribution to the cost of construction, maintenance, and
regulation of traffic on the highways.
Secondly. The tax involved is a burden on interstate commerce, and could be sustained only if shown to be levied solely
as compensation for use of highways or of paying for regulation
of traffic thereon. The statute clearly imposes the charge not
for the above purposes, but for the privilege of engaging in the
interstate bus business, as is evident by the following: (1) Inclusion of the tax in a list of 160 business taxes unmistakably
labels it a business privilege tax and for general revenue purposes; (2) following this bus tax immediately by six sections
dealing exclusively with similar privilege taxes; (3) imposing
on interstate busses a tax of the same character as that levied
for the privilege of engaging in any other business; the range
of those taxes listed from $2.50 to $5,000.00 shows such variation
'8 Note 22.
2,283 U. S. 183.
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in amount that they "appear to be graduated according to assumed earning capacity;" (4) varying the tax on the business
of operating busses according to seating capacity, and specifying it separately for interstate busses, Intrastate busses, and for
intrastate intercounty busses; (5) the contrast between the privilege tax division of the 1927 act and those measures relating
to construction, maintenance, and regulation of traffic on the
highways confirms our view that the interstate bus tax is imposed as a privilege tax for engaging in interstate commerce
and not for compensation for use o4 the highways in interstate
commerce, because the resulting proceeds are directed to the
general fund, while the highway and the motor regulation
statutes since 1915 concerning registration fees, gasoline tax,
general road tax, and highway bond issues direct the proceeds
to the highway fund.
Thirdly. The states may and often do impose a seating
capacity tax on busses in intrastate commerce without regard
to whether the tax represents a just compensation for use of
the highways; but since states can exact of interstate busses a
compensation commensurate with the facilities furnished, the
standard for taxing vehicles in intrastate commerce cannot
apply to those engaged in interstate operation.
Fourthly. "Being valid only if compensatory, the charge
must be necessarily predicated on the use -made or to be made
of the highways of the state. The present act does not make the
amount depend on such use; it does not rise with an increase in
mileage traveled, or even with the number of passengers carried.
Nor is it related to the degree of wear and tear incident to the
using of motor vehicles of different sizes and weights, except
insofar as this is indirectly affected by carrying capacity. The
tax is proportional to the earning capacity of the vehicle."
Fifthly. The relation between the measure and the degree
or mode of use is insufficient to justify the view that the tax
represents merely a compensation for use of the highways by
interstate busses, and consequently it is unnecessary for us to
consider whether the tax "is unreasonably large or unjustly
discriminatory."
With Justice McReynolds dissenting from his opinion, the
Court by vote of 8 to 1 invalidated the interstate bus tax provision of the Tennessee statute.
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Of the eleven cases adjudicated three have come from Ohio,
an early state to establish effective regulation, two each from
California and Texas, and one each from Kansas, Tennessee,
Florida and Pennsylvania. Five cases came from the state
supreme court; six from the Federal district court.
In three cases the lower court was reversed; in eight, affirmed. Justice McReynolds dissented in Interstate Transit
case; Justice Butler in Stephenson v. Binford; Justices Holmes,
Brandeis and Stone in Quaker City Cab case. Excepting the
latter case, there appears a practical unanimity of opinion among
the court members on the questions presented. The opinions
here surveyed reveal that Chief Justice Hughes has replaced
Justice Brandeis as motor carrier opinion writer in the period
3
prior to 1929. 8
The usual common carrier no longer monopolizes the motor
"Youtransportation litigation before the Supreme Court.
drive-it" cars have appeared, and are recognized as public vehicles, are required to obtain a license to use the streets, and pay
a tax for this use. Taxicabs, for four years regulated by state
authority in several jurisdictions, 39 have successfully contested
before the highest Court the application of a statute subjecting
a taxicab corporation to a gross receipts tax not required of
individuals or partnerships operating taxicabs.
But chief importance easily attaches to contract carriers
40
as a type. In accord with the doctrine of the Frost opinion
in 1926, the Court in the Cahoon case negatived the Florida
effort to put contract carriers on the same footing with common
carriers. The state may exact a permit or license of a contract
carrier, but not a certificate of public convenience and necessity,
which is an indispensable requirement for common carriers.
Requiring contract carriers and private motor carriers to provide liability protection only as security against injury or dam* Of the eleven earlier opinions Justice Brandeis prepared four; of
the eleven here surveyed Chief Justice Hughes wrote three. But in
the present eleven the work has been pretty well passed around, Justices Roberts and Cardoza being the only members not preparing an
opinion.
' My "Progress of State Regulation of Taxicabs" in Electric Railway Journal, March 1931; and my "State Regulation of Taxicabs In
1931-1932" appears in an early issue of Public Utilities Fortnightly.
46 Supreme Court Reporter 605.
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age to third persons or their property has been adjudged valid
by the Court. 4 1 This decision is later than that in Smith v.
Cahoon, and follows up and extends the doctrine specified in
Sprot v. South, Bend.42 Contract carriers are subject to state
regulations as to weight limits, control of use of highways and
preservation of highway surface as are common carriers. To
compensate for the use of the highways by contract carriers, the
43
state may apply to them a general and special tax.

In regard to constitutional provisions we find the contract
clause invoked in two cases. 44

Due process of law has proved

an issue in four cases, 45 interstate commerce has appeared in
five ;46 and in eight equal protection of law has been involved. 47
Obviously, the equal protection and contract clauses are invoked
readily by contract carriers; equal protection also appears in
classifications singling out "you-drive-it" vehicles, taxicab corporations, and vehicles operating mainly within a 25-mile radius
of domicile but occasionally going beyond that limit.
From interstate commerce, the dominant constitutional
point involved in earlier Supreme Court litigation, the emphasis
has shifted particularly to equal protection. Indications are
positive that for some years litigation will continue to involve
predominantly the contract carrier and equal protection.
Public authorization may now be required for all types of
motor vehicles operated for others than the owners; Kansas
validly demands a permit for operation of commercial property
vehicles transporting goods sold or to be sold by the owner of
the vehicles. 48 The highest tribunal has affirmed state authority
to prohibit in certificates to interstate common carriers subterfuges devised to enable the carrier to function as an intrastate
Contfnental Baking Co. v. Woodring, Note 22.
"'277 U. S. 162. In Smith v. Cahoon the Court preferred to await
an opinion by the state court on liability protection, a provision of the
Florida statute, to enforce which, no effort had been made.
4"N~ote 41.
1 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, and Stephenson v. Binford,
Advance Opinions, October 1932 Term, 203.
1 Sproles v. Binford, Hodge, Continental Baking, (286 U. S. 352),
and Carley cases.
4 Continental Baking, Sproles v. Binford, Grubb (281 U. S. 470);
Interstate Transit (283 U. S. 183); and Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Advance Opinions, October 1932 Term, 746-50.
47Those in Note 45 plus Quaker City Cab (277 U. S. 389) Smith v.
Cahoon (283 U. S. 353), Stephenson v. Binford, and Bradley cases.
48 Note 22.

KMNTUCKY LAW JoumRAL

carrier without submitting to state regulation as such. Further
the state may refuse to authorize additional motor freight service, even interstate, over a route whose traffic already severe
would become an increased hazard to public safety.
Increasingly wide recognition is being accorded state
power to subject all types of vehicles to size and weight restrictions as a means of conserving the highway, alleviating or
at least discouraging further congestion of highway traffic, and
promoting safety of travel.
Recognizing that accidents will result in motor operation,
the states are extending further requirement of compulsory
liability protection or demonstrated financial ability to compensate for injuries and damages.
Following decisions two years earlier by two Federal district courts holding state cargo insurance inapplicable to interstate carriers of property,49 the Supreme Court in the Ditke50
case invalidated in 1925 the Michigan effort to require property
insurance of a contract carrier in interstate commerce. In 1928
the highest court in Sprout v. South Bend sustained the Indiana
liability insurance requirement as applied to an interstate carrier of passengers "if the liability is limited to injuries caused
within the state to others than passengers.' '51 In holding recently that the state may impose on contract carriers the requirement of "suitable protection for the public against injuries
through the operation on its highways of carriers for hire
whether they are common carriers or private carriers" the
Court in Smith v. Cahoon52 was recognizing the doctrine established in Sprout v. South Bend.
By holding ample the Kansas power to apply liability protection to contract carriers of passengerg and contract carriers
of property as security against injury or damages to third persons and their property, the Court in the Continental Baking
case53 observed the limitations established in the Red Ball, Liberty Highway and Duke cases, but applied vigorously the
a Liberty Highway case, 294 Fed. 703; Red Ball Transit Co. v. Marshall, 8 Fed. (2nd) 635.
5266 U. S. 570.
51277 U. S. 162.
= 283 U. S. 553.
3286 U. S. 352.
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Sprout doctrine as the Court in Smith v. Cahoon indicated could
be done in proper cases.
The Bradley case adds a new paragraph to the chapter of
state authority over interstate motor transportation: By prohibiting additional interstate motor freight service over a proposed
route which is already dangerously congested, the state does not
"regulate" interstate commerce, but acts in such a manner as
to promote public safety by seeking a distribution of motor carriage over a system of highways within the area of the state."
Wide power of the state to tax motor carriers has been
upheld. Over public carriers in intrastate commerce the state
possesses more discretion in imposing taxes. Even the proceeds
of a contract for transportation of the mail between two intrastate points is subject to the state gross receipts tax. 55
But the statute imposing on all corporations a tax on total
gross receipts realized in the state and exempting individuals
and partnerships is invalid as applied to a corporation doing a
taxicab business.5"
All motor carriers in Kansas are validly subjected to a ton
mileage tax in addition to the usual license fees. Application
of this requirement to a purely private motor carrier was sustained by the Court, the requirement of the tax being reasonable,
and the excess of the resulting proceeds over cost of administra57
tion going to the highway fund.
The range of state authority to tax contract carriers constitutes a middle ground between its wide discretion over intrastate motor common carriers on one hand and exclusively interstate common carriers on the other. In taxing the latter type
the state must take care (1) to impose no tax on the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce, or on the earning capacity of
vehicles engaged therein; (2) that the charge be predicated on
the use made or to be made of the highways; (3) that the
amount of the tax constitute a fair contribution to the cost of
construction, maintenance and regulation of traffic on the highr How long will it be before some of the urban states deem it necessary to declaredly distribute over its highways not only interstate
commercial motor transportation of property, but also of passengers,
and even the operation of private vehicles devoted exclusively to noncommercial purposes?
1Note 33.

"Note 34.
"Note 22.
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ways; (4) that resulting proceeds be directed to the highway
fund.5 S
For some years motor carriers have proved serious rivals of
railroad freight service. Until recently most of the recognition
of this rivalry centered around the motor common carrier, more
than an echo of which is found in the recent Bradley case. Today contract motor carriers are contesting vigorously with
railway freight service, especially in the urban and metropolitan
states. Applicable regulation is favoring the railroads, however, a& is revealed in the provision of the valid Texas statute
forbidding authorization of contract motor carriers where to do
so would impair the serivce of established common carriers, and
prohibiting commission fixing of contract carrier rates lower
than those charged by common carriers with' whom the contract
carriers are competing.
Further yielding to the interests of railroads by motor common carriers, even interstate, is clearly deducible from the effect
of the Bradley decision. This merely manifests the broader principles of controlled monopoly and protection for the railroads
clearly discernible in motor carrier regulation for some years
past.59
JoHN J. GEORGE
Rutgers University,
New Brunswick, N. J.

Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183.
11Chapter 13 of my book, and my "Recent Regulatory Trends In
the Bus v. Rail case," Bus Transportation, (McGraw-Hill), December,
1931.

